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NZCPR
Guest Forum
Speech to the NZ Business Round Table by
The Rt.
Hon. Lord Lawson
15 November 07
A
Cool Look at Global Warming. The Economics and politics of
Climate Change
Over
the past half century we have become used to planetary scares
of one kind or another.
But
the latest such scare – global warming – has engaged the
political and opinion-forming classes to a greater extent than
anything since, a little over 200 years ago, Malthus warned
that, unless radical measures were taken to limit population
growth, the world would run up against the limits of
subsistence, leading inevitably to war, pestilence and famine.
This
is partly perhaps because, at least in the richer countries of
the world, we have rightly
become more concerned with environmental issues.
But that is no excuse for abandoning reason.
It
is time to take a cool look at global warming.
By
way of preamble, I readily admit that I am not a scientist.
But
nor are those who have to take the key decisions about this
scientists, let alone climatologists.
They
are responsible politicians who, having listened to the
opinions of the scientists, have to reach the best decisions
they can in the light of the expert evidence available to them
– just as I did, for example, in a not wholly unrelated
field, when I was Energy Secretary in Margaret Thatcher’s
first government in the early 1980s.
More
important still, the science is only part of the story.
Even
if the climate scientists can tell us what is happening and
why – not that they all agree about this, anyway - they
cannot tell us what governments should be doing about it.
For that we also need an understanding of the
economics, of what is the most cost-effective way of tackling
any problem that may arise.
And we also need an understanding of the politics: of
what measures are politically realistic, a particularly tricky
matter given the inescapably global nature of the issue.
It
is frequently claimed, by those who wish to stifle discussion,
that the science of global warming is ‘settled’.
Even if it were, for the reasons I have already
indicated – political, but above all economic – that would
not be the end of the matter.
But
in fact, while some of the science is settled, there is much
that is not.
So
let’s start with the facts.
It
is customary to focus on three of them.
The
first is that, over the past hundred years, the earth has
become slightly warmer.
To
be precise, there has been a rise in global mean annual
temperature of some 0.7º centigrade.
The
second is that, over the past hundred years, the amount of
carbon dioxide in the earth’s atmosphere has risen sharply,
by well over 30 per cent, largely as a result of carbon-based
industrialisation – in particular, electricity generated in
coal- and oil-fired power stations and motorized transport.
And
the third fact (and this is the
settled science) is that carbon dioxide is one of a
number of so-called greenhouse gases – of which far and away
the most important is water vapour, including water suspended
in clouds – which in effect trap some of the heat we receive
from the sun and thus keep the planet warmer than it would
otherwise be.
So
is it not clear that the warming we have seen over the past
hundred years must be due to the massive rise in man-made
carbon dioxide emissions, and that unless we substantially
decarbonise the world economy the warming will continue,
bringing doom and disaster in its wake?
No:
it is not at all clear.
In
the first place, while atmospheric carbon dioxide
concentrations have grown steadily over the past hundred
years, and indeed continue to grow briskly, the warming has
occurred in fits and starts.
To
be precise, it has been confined entirely to two periods: from
1920 to 1940, and from 1975 to 2000.
Between 1940 and 1975 there was a slight cooling; and
so far this century (and contrary to all predictions) there
has been no trend one way or the other.
So
clearly carbon dioxide is only part of the global temperature
story: it is very far from being the whole story.
And
this is borne out by the longer term historical record.
It
is well established, for example, that a thousand years ago,
well before the onset of industrialisation, there was what has
become known as the mediaeval warm period, when temperatures
were probably at least as high as, if not higher, than they
are today.
Going
back even further, during the
Roman Empire
, agricultural records suggest that it was probably even
warmer.
So
we are left with a double uncertainty.
First,
while we know that, other things being equal, rising
atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide will warm the
planet, we have no true understanding of how much they will do
so.
And
second, we know that in fact other things are very far from
equal. So even if
we did know the answer to the first question, we would still
be unable to predict what the world’s temperature will be a
hundred years from now.
These
uncertainties clearly have a profound bearing on the economics
of global warming, and thus on the policies it is sensible to
pursue.
For while we can do our best to make an estimate of the cost
of substantially decarbonising the world economy, we have no
idea of what benefit that will bring in terms of a lower mean
global temperature than would otherwise be the case.
Not
that it is clear, even if we could predict the temperature of
the planet a hundred years from now (which we can’t), how
much economic damage a given rise in temperature would do.
It
was to advise governments on these issues that the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (or IPCC) was set up
in 1988, under the auspices of the United Nations.
The
IPCC concludes, on the basis of to say the least very slender
evidence, that “most” – note, not all – of the warming
that occurred during the last quarter of the 20th century was
very likely due to the growth of atmospheric carbon dioxide
concentrations.
But
even if – and there is clearly a case for erring on the side
of caution – this is so, and even if, as the IPCC blithely
assumes, the natural forces that affect the world’s
temperature in often unpredictable ways can be safely ignored,
the policy conclusions which are widely believed to
follow from this are very suspect indeed.
In
a nutshell, to get a line on how much global warming there is
likely to be over the next hundred years, and what the
practical impact of the consequent rise in global temperatures
might be, the IPCC adds to the assumed nature of the link
between atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide and
temperature, estimates
of how much CO2 emissions are likely in fact to increase over
the next hundred years, based on a number of different
economic development scenarios; and then assesses, largely in
quantified form, the likely consequences of the resulting rise
in world temperature.
All
the IPCC’s scenarios, incidentally, assume that, over the
present century, faster economic growth will mean that living
standards in the developing world, in the conventional sense
of GDP per head of population, will to a very considerable
extent catch up with living standards in the developed world.
In
other words, by 2100 poverty really has become history.
If
nothing else, this should cheer up those who have been told
that disaster stares us in the face if we do not take urgent
action to save the planet.
It
is only fair to add that what I have just spelled out is what
emerges from the IPCC’s scenarios before deducting the
projected costs to the economy of 21st century global warming.
I will of course come to that; and it will be seen that
it does not fundamentally change the picture.
It
is also of course true that the IPCC’s projections of 21st
century economic growth may prove to have been too optimistic;
but in that case, given the assumed
growth-emissions-temperature nexus, there will be less global
warming, too.
As
it is, the temperature projections it does come up with in its
fourth and latest Report range from a rise in the global
average temperature by the year 2100 of 1.8ºC for its lowest
emissions scenario to one of 4ºC for its highest emissions
scenario, with a mean increase of slightly under 3ºC.
At
this point it might be a good idea to leave the rarefied world
of the IPCC for a moment and take a brief reality check.
Is
it really plausible that there is an ideal average world
temperature, which by some happy chance has recently been
visited on us, from which small departures in either direction
would spell disaster?
Moreover, while a sudden change would indeed be
disruptive, what is at issue here is the prospect of a very
gradual change over a hundred years and more.
In
any case, average world temperature is simply a statistical
artefact.
The
actual experienced temperature varies enormously in different
parts of the globe; and man, whose greatest quality is his
adaptability, has successfully colonized most of it.
Two countries at different ends of the earth, both of
which are generally considered to be economic success stories,
are
Finland
and
Singapore
. The average
annual temperature in
Helsinki
is less than 5ºC. That
in
Singapore
is in excess of 27ºC – a difference of more than 22ºC.
If man can successfully cope with that, it is not
immediately apparent why he should not be able to adapt to a
change of 3ºC, when he is given a hundred years in which to
do so.
The
IPCC seeks to assess the likely impact of projected global
warming over the next hundred years in two ways.
First,
it looks separately at five major headings: water, ecosystems,
food, coasts, and health.
Then it adds all these impacts together to provide an
overall figure of the cost to the world of the projected
warming.
This
last is of course intended to be the net cost.
It
is clear that while warming brings costs, it also brings
benefits.
Given
the wide geographical variation in temperatures around the
world, it is obviously likely that, while in the warmer
regions the costs could be expected to exceed the benefits, in
the colder regions the benefits might well exceed the costs.
The
IPCC Report claims to take into account both costs and
benefits, yet it devotes large amounts of space to the costs
and very little to the benefits.
It
is difficult not to sense a lack of even-handedness, leading
to a bias in the overall assessment.
But
let us first take a brief look at the IPCC’s five impact
headings.
The
first is water.
There
is indeed a worldwide water problem, but it has nothing
whatever to do with global warming.
Indeed,
scientists agree that carbon-dioxide induced warming will tend
to increase, rather than reduce, rainfall.
The
problem is the huge increase in the world’s population,
which has led to a massive increase in the demand for fresh
water, without any corresponding increase in the effective
supply.
Thus
improved water resource management, and above all the proper
pricing of water, are of the first importance.
But
what is abundantly clear is that cutting back on carbon
dioxide emissions is irrelevant .
As
to ecosystems, here again it is well established that those
animal species at risk of extinction are threatened far more
by other factors, such as deforestation, than they are by
warming, which is at most of marginal sigificance.
The
IPCC’s third heading, food, is clearly of the first
importance to mankind.
But
what it has to say here has not been sufficiently reported.
I
quote: “Globally, the potential for food production is
projected to increase with increases in local average
temperature over a range of 1-3ºC, but above that it is
projected to decrease”.
It
will be recalled that the mean temperature increase suggested
by the IPCC’s various scenarios for the end of the present
century is a little under 3ºC.
Moreover
this is an area where the scope for adaptation is particularly
pronounced.
It
is not simply a matter of farmers being able to make better
use of irrigation and fertilizers, and indeed to switch to
strains or crops better suited to warmer climes, should the
need arise – something, incidentally, which will happen
autonomously, without any need for government intervention.
It is also because we are in the early stages of a
revolution in agricultural technology, through the development
of bio-engineering and genetic modification.
The
IPCC’s fourth impact category is coasts, where it is
concerned about sea level rise, brought about by a combination
of ocean warming expanding the volume of water and some
melting of the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets,
causing coastal flooding in low-lying areas.
Sea levels have, in fact, been rising very gradually
for as long as records exist, and there is little sign of any
acceleration so far – indeed, if anything the reverse is the
case.
The
fifth and last of the IPCC’s impact categories is health.
There are, of course, very serious health problems of
many kinds throughout much of the developing world, which need
to be tackled in their own right – global warming or no
global warming – much more urgently than they are being at
the present time.
There
is no medical mystery about how to do so.
But
the connection with global warming is, if anything, the
reverse of what the IPCC assumes.
The
major cause of ill-health, and the deaths it brings, in the
developing world is poverty.
Faster
economic growth means less poverty but – according to the
man-made CO2 warming theory, incorporated in the IPCC’s
scenarios – a warmer world.
Warmer
but richer is in fact healthier than colder but poorer.
What,
then, of the IPCC’s overall figure for the likely net cost
of a warmer world, on the assumption that no measures are
taken to curb carbon dioxide emissions, and after carefully
examining all the likely adverse consequences, and rather less
carefully the benefits?
It
will be recalled that the Report’s best estimates of the
likely warming of the planet over the next hundred years range
from a rise of 1.8ºC to one of 4ºC, depending on the
emissions scenario chosen.
The
Report then takes the upper end of the range – a 4ºC
warming - and
claims that, overall, this would mean a loss, by the end of
the 21st century, of anything between 1% and 5% of global
gross domestic product.
It
adds that this is the global average figure, and that
developing countries will experience larger percentage losses.
Given
that this derives from the top end of the range, and given
that the IPCC insists that all its scenarios are of equal
validity, it is clear that, on the basis of the IPCC’s own
methodology, there may be no net cost at all from global
warming over the next hundred years: it may even be
beneficial.
But
let us err on the side of caution, and take not only the top
end of the IPCC’s warming range – a rise of 4ºC over the
next hundred years – but also the top end of its projection
of the net damages, a loss of 5% of world GDP.
A
loss of 5% of world GDP is undoubtedly a very large loss
indeed; but to put it in perspective we need to do some simple
arithmetic.
Heeding
the IPCC’s very proper warning that the loss will be greater
than 5% for the developing countries (and thus less than 5%
for the developed world),
I shall make the calculations on the assumptions of a
10% loss of GDP in the developing world and a 3% loss in the
developed world.
Again,
to err on the side of caution, let us look at the gloomiest of
the IPCC’s economic development scenarios, according to
which living standards (measured in the conventional way as
gross domestic product per head) would rise, in the absence of
global warming, by 1% a year in the developed world, and by
2.3% a year in the developing world.
It can readily be calculated - using, to repeat, a cost
of global warming of 3% of GDP in the developed world and as
much as 10% in the developing world - that the disaster facing
the planet is that our great-grandchildren in the developed
world would, in a hundred years time, be only 2.6 times as
well off as we are today, instead of 2.7 times; and that their
contemporaries in the developing world would be ‘only’
8.5 times as well off as people in the developing world
are today, instead of 9.5 times as well off.
And
this, remember, is the IPCC’s very worst case – and one
based, moreover, as they all are, on a ludicrously pessimistic
assumption of mankind’s ability to adapt to gradual warming,
should it occur.
Indeed,
the single most serious flaw in the IPCC’s analysis of the
likely impact of global warming is its grudging and inadequate
treatment of adaptation, which leads to a systematic
exaggeration of the putative cost of global warming – if,
indeed, over the next hundred years there is any net cost at
all.
The
IPCC prefaces its assessment with the statement that “The
magnitude and timing of impacts will vary with the amount and
timing of climate change and, in some cases, the capacity to
adapt”.
But
adaptation will always occur.
The
capacity to adapt is arguably the most fundamental
characteristic of mankind.
We
have adapted to different temperatures over the millennia we
have been around, and we adapt today to widely different
temperatures around the world.
And
that adaptive capacity is increasing all the time with the
development of technology.
Yet
the concept of static ‘adaptive capacity’ is central to
the IPCC’s analysis.
Thus
in its review of the dangers in different parts of the world,
it explicitly acknowledges that, in the case of Australia and
New Zealand, these will be limited by the fact that “The
region has substantial adaptive capacity due to well-developed
economies and scientific and technical capabilities”.
Presumably
the same applies to Europe and
North America
, although, curiously, the IPCC does not say so.
But it does express concern about the effect of
projected warming on the poorer regions of the world,
particularly in Africa and parts of
Asia
, because of their “low adaptive capacity”.
This
somewhat patronizing judgment seems ill-founded for three
reasons. First, as
we have seen, on the IPCC’s own economic growth projections,
on which its temperature projections rest, the poorer regions
are, for the most part, not going to be poor in a hundred
years time.
Second,
for those parts that do remain poor, overseas aid programmes
will clearly be focused on improving their adaptive capacity,
should the need arise.
(This
is, incidentally, a much more realistic objective for overseas
aid than the promotion of economic development.)
And
third, there will almost certainly be substantial
technological development over the next hundred years, which
will significantly enhance adaptive capacity worldwide, in
many cases far beyond what it is at the present time.
In
short, the IPCC’s analysis and conclusions are seriously
undermined by the systematic underestimate of the benefits of
adaptation, deriving both from its assumption that ‘adaptive
capacity’ is severely and permanently constrained by
economic underdevelopment in the developing world, and its
assumption that, for the world as a whole, it is constrained
by the limits of existing technology – that is, the
assumption that there will be no further technological
development over the next hundred years.
This
last is clearly absurd in the important case of agriculture
and food production, and is implausible in general.
As
a result, the IPCC’s overall cost assessment inevitably
suffers from a pronounced upward bias.
It
is true that some forms of adaptation, such as the creation or
improvement of sea and flood defences, would, if and when they
became necessary, require government intervention. The IPCC,
needless to say, adopts its characteristically downbeat
approach to this, declaring that “Adaptation for coastal
regions will be more challenging in developing countries than
developed countries, due to constraints on adaptive
capacity”.
It
must be said that the challenge ought to be a manageable one:
the Dutch, after all, managed it pretty effectively even with
the technology of the 16th century, and technology has
scarcely stood still over the past half-millennium.
But
this might well be a suitable focus for overseas aid, should
the need arise.
In
short, even if the conventional scientific wisdom is correct,
there remains the fundamental question of what is the most
cost-effective way of addressing
the likely consequences of global warming.
Is
it to adapt to them, as man has adapted throughout the ages
and throughout the world to the vagaries of the climate, or is
it to attempt to prevent them, even if this means radically
transforming the global economy at very considerable cost?
The
answer, I believe, is clear.
The
alarmists reply that global warming presents some threats to
the planet that are so dire that adaptation is not possible.
But
there is nothing in the current state of climate science to
warrant this.
Let’s
take a look at the three most frequently mentioned
catastrophic consequences.
First,
in the light of Katrina, hurricanes.
The
facts are that, of the ten most severe Atlantic hurricanes
since 1900, five occurred in the first half of the period and
five in the second half. Seven
out of the ten occurred before 1975, that is to say, before
the period when the bulk of the modest 20th century global
warming began.
The
worst of all, by far, was the Great Miami Hurricane of 1926.
In
the eyes of the insurance industry, there has of course been a
significant rise in hurricane damage over the years.
But
that is simply because the huge rise in both population and
property values in the affected areas has inevitably caused a
substantial increase in damage costs for any given tropical
storm.
Next,
the melting of the polar ice sheets, and its alleged effect on
sea levels.
Clearly,
the melting of floating polar ice cannot cause any rise in sea
levels – just as the melting of ice cubes in your glass of
water cannot cause the water to overflow the glass.
The
issue is solely about the land borne ice at the poles.
And
the overwhelming mass of this, and thus of most significance
for global sea levels in this context, is not over Greenland
in the north but over the vast continent of
Antarctica
in the south.
Here
it is perfectly true that the West Antarctic ice sheet,
covering the peninsular which points its finger towards the
southern tip of
South America
, is showing evidence of melting and glacier retreat.
But
the West Antarctic peninsular accounts for only around 10 per
cent of Antarctic land borne ice, and has a different climate
from the rest of
Antarctica
.
In
most of the other 90 per cent of the continent, according to
the most recent research, the ice sheet appears to be growing.
Finally,
in Europe in particular, there is a fear of a reversal of the
Gulf Stream
and thus – paradoxically – the onset of very much colder
weather. Although
there is ample evidence of fluctuations in the strength of the
Gulf Stream
from time to time, research has shown no sign of any secular
slowdown over the past decade.
Nor
is there any reason to suppose that there will be even if
there is further global warming over the coming decades, since
the
Gulf Stream
is largely a surface current and thus a wind-driven
phenomenon.
It
is clear, therefore, that even after looking carefully at the
worst nightmare scenarios the alarmists can conjure up, there
is no reason to believe that, even if the IPCC’s projections
of global warming over the coming century are realized, which
is unlikely, there is anything to which mankind cannot adapt.
Moreover,
to the extent that there is a problem of global warming, it is
manifestly a global problem.
And
if the chosen policy for addressing it is to cut back on
carbon dioxide emissions, the cutback clearly has to be
global, too.
Thus
the perspective of the developing world is of the first
importance.
And
it is in the developing world, particularly
China
and
India
, where emissions are growing fastest.
Indeed,
China
is very soon set to overtake the
United States
as the single biggest source of emissions, if it has not done
so already, chiefly because its rapidly growing economy is so
heavily dependent on energy-intensive manufacturing industry.
Both
China
and
India
have made their position abundantly clear; and it has to be
said that it is thoroughly understandable, and reflects the
perspective of most of the developing world.
Their
overriding priority is to continue along the path of rapid
economic growth and development.
Only in this way can the widespread poverty which still
afflicts their people be relieved.
They
observe that the industrialized countries of the western world
achieved their prosperity thanks to cheap carbon-based energy,
and they believe that it is now their turn to do the same.
They
add that if there is now a problem of excessive carbon dioxide
concentrations in the earth’s atmosphere, it is the
responsibility of those who overwhelmingly caused it to remedy
it.
At
the very most, they are prepared to concede that, if and when
their emissions per head of population have risen to the
levels of emissions per head in the rich world, there might be
the basis for an international agreement which would be fair
for all. But until
then, there can be no question of their agreeing to any
restrictions on their emissions.
Indeed,
following this year’s G8 Summit in
Germany
, the official German news agency reported that “Chinese
President Hu Jintao and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
have created a new alliance to spearhead emerging economies’
opposition to developed nations seeking to impose limits on
their greenhouse gas emissions”.
So
where does this leave the prospect of an effective global
agreement to prevent the further growth of carbon dioxide
concentrations in the atmosphere?
Not,
it has to be said, in very good shape.
It
is perfectly true that spokesmen for both the United States
and the major developing countries are from time to time
prepared to pay lip service to the idea of a global agreement
on limiting emissions, provided the burden of doing so is
equitably shared.
But
what the United States considers an equitable sharing of the
burden is worlds apart from what China and India consider
equitable; and there is no prospect whatever of this chasm
- it is far more than a gap – being closed.
This,
then, is where we are now.
The
Kyoto
approach is dead and buried.
Admittedly,
the European Union is still theoretically committed to going
it alone, having agreed in principle to cut its emissions by
20 per cent (below 1990 levels) by 2020.
But
the problem with one or more countries going it alone is not
simply the heavy cost to those who do so.
It
is also the nugatory reduction in overall global emissions
that this would lead to.
This
is because the only practical way of cutting back on carbon
dioxide emissions is to raise the cost of carbon-based energy,
whether by taxation or by the rationing system known as
emissions trading; so that energy-saving becomes more
attractive and non-carbon-based energy more competitive.
But as energy prices in, for example,
New Zealand
rise, with the prospect of further rises to come,
energy-intensive industries and processes would progressively
decline in
New Zealand
and expand in countries like
China
, where cheap energy remained available.
No
doubt
New Zealand
could, at some cost, adjust to this.
But
it is difficult to see the point of it.
For if carbon dioxide emissions in New Zealand are
reduced, only to see them further increased in, for example,
China, there will be little if any net reduction in global
emissions at all.
Meanwhile,
the most striking feature of the so-called climate change
debate is the complete disconnection between the rhetoric and
the reality. Despite
the posturing of politicians throughout much of the world,
despite the declarations that global warming is the greatest
threat facing the planet, despite Kyoto and despite
innumerable international gatherings of the great and the
good, little in practice has been done and global carbon
dioxide emissions continue to rise.
The
reason for this, of course, is that fine words are cheap,
whereas the 70 per cent reduction in global carbon dioxide
emissions which would be required to stabilize carbon dioxide
concentrations in the earth’s atmosphere would be very
costly indeed.
So
how much would it cost to reduce carbon dioxide emissions per
unit of output to the extent allegedly required?
The
only honest answer is that we do not know; but
all the signs are that it would prove very expensive
indeed. One
test is to consider how high a carbon tax would need to be in
order to generate the necessary change in behaviour, both on
the supply side and the demand side.
And
it is significant that this is something which those
politicians who identify global warming as the greatest threat
facing the planet are conspicuously reluctant to discuss, let
alone to propose.
The
IPCC, in its 2007 Report, suggests (and I quote) that “the
costs and benefits of mitigation…are broadly comparable in
magnitude” – although in fact, as we have already seen, it
greatly exaggerates the benefits of mitigation by its
systematic undervaluation of adaptation.
But
even if it were the case that the costs and benefits of
mitigation are broadly comparable in magnitude, the
fundamental question, when comparing the costs and the
benefits – even if we accept the conventional wisdom so far
as the science is concerned, and even if we assume that a
global agreement is attainable, however unlikely that may seem
– is this.
How
great a sacrifice is it either reasonable or realistic to ask
the present generation, particularly the present generation in
the developing world, suffering as it still does from extreme
poverty, malnutrition, disease and premature death, to make in
the hope of benefiting substantially better-off generations a
hundred or two hundred years hence?
The
answer is clear: not a lot.
It
is not that we don’t care about future generations.
It is that we do care about the present generation.
Nor
does invocation of the so-called precautionary principle
overturn this conclusion.
The
fact that climate science is so uncertain that we cannot be
absolutely sure that there is not a catastrophe awaiting the
people of the world a hundred or two hundred years hence
cannot rationally be used as the basis for horrendously costly
policy decisions now.
In
a world of inevitably finite resources, we cannot possibly
spend large sums on guarding against any and every possible
eventuality in the future.
Reason
suggests that we concentrate on present ills, such as poverty
and disease, and on future dangers, such as nuclear conflict
and terrorism, where the probability appears significant –
usually because the signs of their emergence are already
incontrovertible.
The
fact that a theoretical future danger might be devastating is
not enough to justify substantial expenditure of resources
here and now, particularly since there are many other such
dangers wholly unconnected with global warming.
So
does all this mean that we should do nothing about global
warming? Not
quite, although doing nothing is better than doing something
stupid. But there
are, in fact, some sensible things that can be done.
It
clearly makes sense to press ahead with research and
development in technologies that might assist the process of
adaptation should that be required, as well as having
practical utility even in the absence of warming.
Another
form of R & D which is rightly taking place at the present
time, although so far only in the United States, involves what
has become known as geoengineering; that is, the technology of
cooling the planet, in relatively short order, should the need
become pressing. The
front runner here is the idea of blasting suphur aerosols into
the stratosphere, so as to impede the sun’s rays.
This
is not as far-fetched as it seems.
It is what happens naturally, when large volcanoes
erupt.
The
most recent such occasion was the eruption of Mount Pinatubo,
in the
Philippines
, in 1991, which led to a two-year cooling of the earth’s
temperature, with no adverse side-effects.
More
importantly, there is of course the need to do whatever is
needed to adapt to a warmer planet, should the late 20th
century warming, which has for the time being paused, soon
resume, as the majority of climate scientists are currently
predicting. For
the most part this can and will happen spontaneously and
autonomously, just as mankind has always adapted to the
environment around him, wherever he lives, without any need
for government intervention.
But
there are some exceptional areas – what the economists call
the supply of ‘public goods’ – where governments do need
to stand ready to act.
The
provision of adequate sea and flood defences is the most
obvious example.
Moreover,
as we have seen, even though the IPCC’s projected warming
over the next hundred years, if it occurs, may well not be
harmful overall, there would be losers in the warmer regions
of the developing world.
Should
this seem likely to occur, I believe we have a clear moral
obligation to help them.
It
is true that the record of overseas aid in promoting economic
development is very disappointing. But that is no argument
against assistance in, for example, the building of effective
sea defences.
Of
course it would cost money.
But
quite apart from our moral obligation, it is only a minuscule
fraction of what it would cost to attempt, by substantially
cutting back on carbon dioxide emissions, to control the
global temperature.
What
is important is that the practical measures I have outlined in
the last few pages represent the sum total of what we should
be doing.
It
has to be said that this is not the easiest of messages to get
across – not least because the issues surrounding global
warming are so often discussed in terms of belief rather than
reason.
Indeed,
the more one examines the current global warming orthodoxy,
the more it resembles a Da Vinci Code of environmentalism.
It
is a great story, and a phenomenal best seller.
It
contains a grain of truth – and a mountain of nonsense.
And
that nonsense could be very damaging indeed.
We
appear to have entered a new age of unreason, which threatens
to be as economically harmful as it is profoundly disquieting.
It
is from this, above all, that we really do need to save the
planet.
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